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Division, Second Department reiterated the rule set forth in
Hernandez, that a trial court should be given great deference to
determine whether or not counsel's race neutral explanations are
9
pretextual. 17
In conclusion, federal courts and the New York courts clearly
give great deference to a trial court's determination of the
credibility of trial counsel's race neutral explanations.
Accordingly, upon finding that the trial court was not clearly
erroneous in determining that defense counsel's race neutral

explanations were pretextual, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, in
defendant. 180

Jones,

affirmed

the

conviction

of

the

People v. Stiff1 8 1
(decided December 12, 1994)

The criminal defendant claimed the trial court erred when it
refused to allow him to use his peremptory challenges to
"exclude potential jurors because they [did] not belong to a
particular racial group." 182 The Appellate Division, Second
Department, concluded that it was unconstitutional for either the
defendant or the prosecutor to use racially motivated peremptory

People v. Green, 181 A.D.2d 693, 694, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (2d Dep't
1990) (affirming trial court's finding that defendant counsel's race neutral
basis proffered for challenge to white juror was pretextual).
178. 181 A.D.2d 693, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357. In Green, the prosecution
objected to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges claiming they were
being used to exclude white jurors. Id. at 693, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 358. Eleven of
the defendant's thirteen peremptory challenges were used to exclude potential
white jurors. Id. The prosecution proceeded to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and defense counsel was forced to "articulate race-neutral
explanations for the challenges." Id. Finding the excuses to be pretextual, the
trial court seated two of the jurors to which the defendant had objected. Id.
179. Id. at 694, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
180. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
181. 206 A.D.2d 235, 620 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d Dep't 1994).
182. Id. at 236, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
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challenges. 1 83 This includes situations where the challenges are
not used against members of a "cognizable racial group," 184
where a showing of purported discrimination can be established
based solely upon the pattern of strikes used by the party. 185 The
court held that this type of discrimination violated the jurors'
rights under the Equal Protection and Civil Rights Clauses of the

State Constitution, 186 as well as the Equal Protection Clause of

18
the Federal Constitution.

7

In Stiff, during the jury selection for the criminal trial of a
black defendant, the prosecutor raised a "Batson challenge"' 88
183. Id.
184. Id. at 239, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 90. A cognizable racial group has been
defined as "one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws." Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1976)
(citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 494 (1954)).
185. Stiff, 206 A.D.2d at 240, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
186. Id. at 242, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 92. N.Y. CONST. art I, §11. Section 11
states in relevant part:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person.., or by the state or any agency or subdivision of
the state.
Id.
187. Stiff, 206 A.D.2d at 242, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 92. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Section I provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
188. Stiff, 206 A.D.2d at 236, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 89. This challenge draws
its name from the United States Supreme Court case of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Court held that peremptory challenges
cannot be used by the prosecutor to exclude potential jurors because of their
race. Id. at 89. The Court established a test to determine upon what
circumstances a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination can be drawn.
[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group... [T]he prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges
to remove from the venire members of the defendant's
race .... Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any
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after objecting to five of the defendant's peremptory challenges,
"noting that panelist number two was a white male, number four
was an Asian male, number seven was an [sic] Hispanic male,
number nine was a white female, and number fourteen was an
[sic] Hispanic female." 189 After observing that none of the
challenged jurors were black, the trial judge concluded that there
was a prima facie showing that the defendant had used "his
[peremptory] challenges in a racially discriminatory manner." 190

Upon this determination, the court required the defendant to
support these challenges with race-neutral reasons. After hearing
the

defendant's

alleged

race-neutral

explanations

for

his

peremptory challenges, the court replaced jurors two and nine,
holding that the defendant's reasons for excluding them were
merely pretextual. 19 1 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
returned a guilty verdict. 192
The issue before the court was whether a defendant could use
peremptory challenges to exclude persons of all other races other
than his or her own. 193 In affirming the trial court's decision that
the use of peremptory challenges in this manner was
other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the venire men from the petit jury on account of
their race.
Id. at 96.
189. Stiff, 206 A.D.2d at 236, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
190. Id. at 236-37, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
191. Id. at 237, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 89. As to panelist two, the court rejected
the defendant's argument that he should be excluded "because he was
employed in a supervisory capacity, and because he had previously sat on a
civil jury." Id. The court allowed panelist four to be excluded based on the
defendant's argument that "his employment as a subway train operator and
resulting contact with the New York City Transit Police might taint his
objectivity." Id. Panelist seven was also excluded because, during voir dire, he
stated that "he might find a police officer more credible than other witnesses."
Id. As to panelist nine, the trial judge rejected the defendant's argument that
she would be biased against him because she worked for "New York
Telephone, a large 'hierarchical organization.'" Id. Panelist fourteen was
removed sua sponte by the court because it appeared that she had difficulty
understanding English. Id.
192. Id.

193. Id. at 236, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
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impermissible, the court extended the holding of the New York
Court of Appeal's decision, People v. Kern. 194 In Kern, the court
held that neither the defendant nor the prosecutor was permitted,
through the use of peremptory challenges, "to exclude a
particular racial group from the petit jury .... "195
In Stiff, the defendant argued that the prosecution "failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination" as required under
Batson, because "nonblacks are not a 'cognizable racial
group.' 196 In its extension of Kern, the appellate division
reasoned that "application of the 'cognizable racial group'
standard in a manner which requires the party challenging the
exclusions to demonstrate exclusion of a single, particular racial
group, would permit a defendant to 'stack' the jury with
members of his own race to the exclusion of all others." 197
The court ultimately determined that "the central concern" in
all variations of a Batson situation, where the excluded jurors are
not the same race as the defendant, "is the right of every citizen
194. 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, cert. denied,
498 U.S. 824 (1990). In Kern, three white male defendants accused of
manslaughter as well as several lesser charges stemming from their attack of
two black teenagers, continually used their peremptory challenges throughout
jury selection to exclude black jurors. Id. at 647-48, 554 N.E.2d at 1239-40,
555 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52.
195. Id. at 650, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653. See Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) ("[The exercise of a peremptory
challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial
stereotype held by the party.").
196. Stiff, 206 A.D.2d at 240, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
197. Id. It appears that the appellate division discarded the requirement that
the juror be part of a cognizable racial group when Batson challenges are
raised. The court distinguishes the case at bar from People v. Smith, 81
N.Y.2d 875, 613 N.E.2d 539, 597 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1993). In Smith, the New
York Court of Appeals held that, due to the fact that "[t]he record [was] silent
in this case as to the race or ethnicity of the excluded jurors... 'minorities' in
general [do not] constitute a cognizable racial group." Id. at 876, 613 N.E.2d
at 540, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 634. The Smith court therefore concluded that the
defendant had not net the standard of showing purposeful discrimination as
established in Batson. Id. In the case at bar, the prosecution clearly "state[d]
on the record the race or ethnic background of each excluded
juror ....[Moreover,] there is no claim here that the defendant excluded a
vaguely-defined group .... " Stiff, 206 A.D. 2d at 241, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
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to sit on a jury." 198 In reaching this conclusion, the court
followed the reasoning of the Kern court when it held that the
exclusion of a potential juror for racially motivated reasons
violated that juror's civil rights and equal protection under the
State Constitution. 199
In determining whether the Civil Rights Clause applied to

protect jurors from a defendant's peremptory challenge, the Kern
court held that, due to the fact that the Civil Rights Clause is not
self-executing, it would be necessary to find either a statute,
common law, or provision in the Constitution which prohibits
discrimination in order to effectuate the clause. 200 In order to
prevent potential discrimination against a juror, the court utilized
the Civil Rights Clause and applied it to peremptory challenges.
The court found both legislative and Constitutional support for

doing this. 201 First, "jury service is a 'privilege of citizenship'
secured to citizens of this State by Article I, [section] 1 of the
State Constitution." ' 202 Secondly, Civil Rights Law section 13
prohibits the disqualification of potential jurors on account of
198. Stiff, 206 A.D.2d at 238, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (emphasis added). See,
e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) ("Be it at the hands
of the State or the defense, if a court allows jurors to be excluded because of
group bias, it is a willing participant in a scheme that could undermine the
very foundation of our system of justice.. . ."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 408 (1991) ("Whether jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a
duty, the State may no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to
others on racial grounds ....
"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986)
("[Tlhe rule of law will be strengthened if we insure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race."); Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 652,
554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654 ("A citizen's privilege to be free of
racial discrimination in the qualification for jury service is hardly a privilege if
that individual may nevertheless be kept from service on the petit jury solely
because of race.").
199. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 650-58, 554 N.E.2d at 1241-47, 555 N.Y.S.2d at
653-59.
200. Id. at 650, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
201. Id. at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
202. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 1. Section 1 states in pertinent part: "No
member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or
privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the
judgment of his peers." Id.
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race. 203 Based on these factors, the court concluded that the Civil
Rights Clause is applicable in this instance and prohibits
"purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
2 04
challenges."
The Kern court further established that a defendant's use of
racially motivated peremptory challenges violated a potential
juror's equal protection rights under the New York State
Constitution. 205 Unlike a claim for a violation of the Civil Rights
Clause, which prohibits private as well as state discrimination, a
claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause requires a
showing of state action. 206 In Kern, the court held that:
IThere can be no question that the State is inevitably .and
inextricably involved in the process of excluding jurors as a
result of a defendant's peremptory challenges. A defendant's
right to exercise the challenges is conferred by State
statute.... The jurors are summoned for jury service by the

State... sit in a public courtroom and are subject to voir dire at
the direction of the State, and.

. .

it is the judge with the full

coercive authority of the State, who enforces the discriminatory
decision by ordering the excused juror to leave the
courtroom ....207
Based on the foregoing, the court held that a defendant's
peremptory challenges are to be considered state action subject to
claims brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause "and
therefore Batson applies to the defense. "208
203. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1992). Section 13 provides

in pertinent part: "No citizen of the state possessing all other qualifications
which are or may be required or prescribed by law, shall be disqualified to
serve as a grand or petit juror in any court of this state on account of race,
creed, color, national origin or sex." Id.
204. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
205. Id. at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
206. See N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11.
207. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 656, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
208. Id. at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658. In holding that
a defendant who used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner violated a potential juror's civil rights, as well as the juror's equal

protection rights under the state Constitution, the Kern court only resolved half
of the issue because jurors themselves cannot raise issues to the court. Rather it
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It appears that New York law is consistent with federal law
regarding this issue. In Georgia v. McCollum,

209

the United

States Supreme Court held that a juror's Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection was violated when the defendants
purposefully discriminated based on the juror's race during their
use of peremptory challenges in the jury selection. 2 10 Based on
the foregoing, it appears that both under New York law and
federal law a criminal defendant must follow the same procedures
that a prosecutor would utilize with respect to the use of
peremptory challenges in the selection of jury panels.
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
2 11
Pierre v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.
(printed December 28, 1994)

The attorney plaintiffs argued that New York's Judiciary Law
section 474-a2 12 violated the separation of powers doctrine, as
well as their due process rights and equal protection rights under
is the prosecutor who can invoke a claim on the behalf of the excluded jurors.
"[A]s a representative of the community, the District Attorney has a direct
interest in protecting its citizens and therefore a substantial relationship with
the excluded jurors. Moreover, as the jurors are not parties to the
litigation.., the State should be able to vindicate their rights." Id. at 654,
554 N.E.2d at 1244, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
209. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). Prior to jury selection, three white defendants
accused of beating two African-Americans exlressed that "the circumstances
of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from
participating as jurors in the trial." Id. at 2351.
210. Id. at 2359. In McCollum, the supreme court held, for essentially the
same reasons as did the New York Court of Appeals in Kern, that a
defendant's peremptory challenges were to be considered "state action" when
under the review of the Equal Protection Clause and that the state had standing
to raise the claim on behalf of the jurors. Id. at 2355-57.
211. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1994, at25 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1994).
212. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney 1986).
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